This adds the possibility to set `strict-dynamic` on `script-src-elem` only while keep the default rules for `script-src`.
The idea is to allow loading module js which imports other files and thus does not allow nonces on import but on the initial script tag.
Signed-off-by: Ferdinand Thiessen <opensource@fthiessen.de>
If a page has a Content Security Policy header and the `script-src` (or
`default-src`) directive does not contain neither `wasm-unsafe-eval` nor
`unsafe-eval` loading and executing WebAssembly is blocked in the page
(although it is still possible to load and execute WebAssembly in a
worker thread).
Although the Nextcloud classes to manage the CSP already supported
allowing `unsafe-eval` this affects not only WebAssembly, but also the
`eval` operation in JavaScript.
To make possible to allow WebAssembly execution without allowing
JavaScript `eval` this commit adds support for allowing
`wasm-unsafe-eval`.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Calviño Sánchez <danxuliu@gmail.com>
frame-ancestors doesn't fall back to default-src. So when we apply a
very restricted CSP we should make sure to set it to 'none' and not
leave it empty.
Signed-off-by: Roeland Jago Douma <roeland@famdouma.nl>
* Order the imports
* No leading slash on imports
* Empty line before namespace
* One line per import
* Empty after imports
* Emmpty line at bottom of file
Signed-off-by: Roeland Jago Douma <roeland@famdouma.nl>
CSP nonces are a feature available with CSP v2. Basically instead of saying "JS resources from the same domain are ok to be served" we now say "Ressources from everywhere are allowed as long as they add a `nonce` attribute to the script tag with the right nonce.
At the moment the nonce is basically just a `<?php p(base64_encode($_['requesttoken'])) ?>`, we have to decode the requesttoken since `:` is not an allowed value in the nonce. So if somebody does on their own include JS files (instead of using the `addScript` public API, they now must also include that attribute.)
IE does currently not implement CSP v2, thus there is a whitelist included that delivers the new CSP v2 policy to newer browsers. Check http://caniuse.com/#feat=contentsecuritypolicy2 for the current browser support list. An alternative approach would be to just add `'unsafe-inline'` as well as `'unsafe-inline'` is ignored by CSPv2 when a nonce is set. But this would make this security feature unusable at all in IE. Not worth it at the moment IMO.
Implementing this offers the following advantages:
1. **Security:** As we host resources from the same domain by design we don't have to worry about 'self' anymore being in the whitelist
2. **Performance:** We can move oc.js again to inline JS. This makes the loading way quicker as we don't have to load on every load of a new web page a blocking dynamically non-cached JavaScript file.
If you want to toy with CSP see also https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/
Signed-off-by: Lukas Reschke <lukas@statuscode.ch>
* Move a-b to PSR-4
* Move c-d to PSR-4
* Move e+g to PSR-4
* Move h-l to PSR-4
* Move m-r to PSR-4
* Move s-u to PSR-4
* Move files/ to PSR-4
* Move remaining tests to PSR-4
* Remove Test\ from old autoloader
Ferdinand Thiessen
Christoph Wurst
Daniel Kesselberg
Andy Scherzinger
Daniel Calviño Sánchez
Côme Chilliet
Roeland Jago Douma
Morris Jobke
Lukas Reschke
Joas Schilling