mirror of https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea.git
test: add unit tests for permission checker
Testing fork PR restrictions, org caps, and workflow limits. Should have decent coverage now. Signed-off-by: SBALAVIGNESH123 <balavignesh449@gmail.com>pull/36113/head
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// Copyright 2024 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved.
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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package actions
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import (
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"testing"
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actions_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/actions"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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)
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// TestGetEffectivePermissions_ForkPRAlwaysRestricted verifies that fork PRs
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// are always restricted regardless of repo or org settings.
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// This is critical for security - we don't want malicious forks to gain elevated
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// permissions just by opening a PR. See the discussion in:
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// https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/24554#issuecomment-1537040811
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func TestGetEffectivePermissions_ForkPRAlwaysRestricted(t *testing.T) {
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// Even if repo has permissive mode enabled
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repoPerms := map[string]map[string]bool{
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"contents": {"read": true, "write": true},
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"packages": {"read": true, "write": true},
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"issues": {"read": true, "write": true},
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}
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// Fork PR should still be read-only
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result := applyForkPRRestrictions(repoPerms)
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assert.True(t, result["contents"]["read"], "Should allow reading contents")
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assert.False(t, result["contents"]["write"], "Should NOT allow writing contents")
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assert.False(t, result["packages"]["write"], "Should NOT allow package writes")
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assert.False(t, result["issues"]["write"], "Should NOT allow issue writes")
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}
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// TestOrgPermissionsCap verifies that organization settings act as a ceiling
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// for repository settings. Repos can be more restrictive but not more permissive.
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func TestOrgPermissionsCap(t *testing.T) {
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// Org says: no package writes
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orgPerms := map[string]map[string]bool{
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"packages": {"read": true, "write": false},
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"contents": {"read": true, "write": true},
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}
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// Repo tries to enable package writes
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repoPerms := map[string]map[string]bool{
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"packages": {"read": true, "write": true}, // Trying to override!
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"contents": {"read": true, "write": true},
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}
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result := capPermissions(repoPerms, orgPerms)
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// Org restriction should win
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assert.False(t, result["packages"]["write"], "Org should prevent package writes")
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assert.True(t, result["contents"]["write"], "Contents write should be allowed")
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}
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// TestWorkflowCannotEscalate verifies that workflow file declarations
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// cannot grant more permissions than repo/org settings allow.
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// This is important because in Gitea, anyone with write access can edit workflows
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// (unlike GitHub which has CODEOWNERS protection).
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func TestWorkflowCannotEscalate(t *testing.T) {
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// Base permissions: read-only for packages
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basePerms := map[string]map[string]bool{
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"packages": {"read": true, "write": false},
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"contents": {"read": true, "write": true},
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}
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// Workflow tries to declare package write
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workflowPerms := map[string]string{
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"packages": "write", // Trying to escalate!
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"contents": "write",
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}
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result := applyWorkflowPermissions(basePerms, workflowPerms)
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// Should NOT be able to escalate
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assert.False(t, result["packages"]["write"], "Workflow should not escalate package perms")
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assert.True(t, result["contents"]["write"], "Contents write should still work")
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}
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// TestWorkflowCanReducePermissions verifies that workflows CAN reduce permissions
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// This is useful for defense-in-depth - even if repo has broad permissions,
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// a specific workflow can declare it only needs minimal permissions.
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func TestWorkflowCanReducePermissions(t *testing.T) {
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// Base permissions: write access
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basePerms := map[string]map[string]bool{
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"contents": {"read": true, "write": true},
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"issues": {"read": true, "write": true},
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}
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// Workflow declares it only needs read
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workflowPerms := map[string]string{
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"contents": "read",
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"issues": "none", // Explicitly denies
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}
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result := applyWorkflowPermissions(basePerms, workflowPerms)
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assert.True(t, result["contents"]["read"], "Should allow reading")
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assert.False(t, result["contents"]["write"], "Should reduce to read-only")
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assert.False(t, result["issues"]["read"], "Should deny issues entirely")
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}
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// TestRestrictedModeDefaults verifies that restricted mode has sensible defaults
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// We want it to be usable (can clone code, read metadata) but secure (no writes)
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func TestRestrictedModeDefaults(t *testing.T) {
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perms := getRestrictedPermissions()
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// Should be able to read code (needed for checkout action)
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assert.True(t, perms["contents"]["read"], "Must be able to read code")
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assert.True(t, perms["metadata"]["read"], "Must be able to read metadata")
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// Should NOT be able to write anything
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assert.False(t, perms["contents"]["write"], "Should not write code")
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assert.False(t, perms["packages"]["write"], "Should not write packages")
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assert.False(t, perms["issues"]["write"], "Should not write issues")
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}
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// TestPermissionModeTransitions tests that changing modes works correctly
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// This is important for the UI - users should be able to switch modes easily
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func TestPermissionModeTransitions(t *testing.T) {
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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mode actions_model.PermissionMode
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expectPackageWrite bool
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expectContentsWrite bool
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}{
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{
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name: "Restricted mode - no writes",
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mode: actions_model.PermissionModeRestricted,
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expectPackageWrite: false,
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expectContentsWrite: false,
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},
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{
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name: "Permissive mode - has writes",
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mode: actions_model.PermissionModePermissive,
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expectPackageWrite: true,
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expectContentsWrite: true,
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},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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perm := &actions_model.ActionTokenPermission{
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PermissionMode: tt.mode,
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}
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permMap := perm.ToPermissionMap()
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assert.Equal(t, tt.expectPackageWrite, permMap["packages"]["write"])
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assert.Equal(t, tt.expectContentsWrite, permMap["contents"]["write"])
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})
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}
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}
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// TestMultipleLayers tests the full permission calculation with all layers
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// This simulates a real-world scenario with org, repo, and workflow permissions
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func TestMultipleLayers(t *testing.T) {
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// Scenario: Org allows package reads, Repo allows package writes,
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// but workflow only declares package read
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orgPerms := map[string]map[string]bool{
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"packages": {"read": true, "write": false}, // Org blocks writes
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}
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repoPerms := map[string]map[string]bool{
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"packages": {"read": true, "write": true}, // Repo tries to enable
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}
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workflowPerms := map[string]string{
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"packages": "read", // Workflow only needs read
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}
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// Apply caps (org limits repo)
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afterOrgCap := capPermissions(repoPerms, orgPerms)
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assert.False(t, afterOrgCap["packages"]["write"], "Org should block write")
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// Apply workflow (workflow selects read)
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final := applyWorkflowPermissions(afterOrgCap, workflowPerms)
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assert.True(t, final["packages"]["read"], "Should have read access")
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assert.False(t, final["packages"]["write"], "Should not have write (org blocked)")
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}
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// BenchmarkPermissionCalculation measures permission calculation performance
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// This is important because permission checks happen on every API call with Actions tokens
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// We want to ensure this doesn't become a bottleneck
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func BenchmarkPermissionCalculation(b *testing.B) {
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repoPerms := map[string]map[string]bool{
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"actions": {"read": true, "write": false},
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"contents": {"read": true, "write": true},
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"issues": {"read": true, "write": true},
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"packages": {"read": true, "write": true},
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"pull_requests": {"read": true, "write": false},
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"metadata": {"read": true, "write": false},
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}
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orgPerms := map[string]map[string]bool{
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"actions": {"read": true, "write": false},
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"contents": {"read": true, "write": false},
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"issues": {"read": true, "write": false},
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"packages": {"read": false, "write": false},
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"pull_requests": {"read": true, "write": false},
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"metadata": {"read": true, "write": false},
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}
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workflowPerms := map[string]string{
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"contents": "read",
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"packages": "read",
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}
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b.ResetTimer()
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for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
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capped := capPermissions(repoPerms, orgPerms)
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_ = applyWorkflowPermissions(capped, workflowPerms)
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}
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}
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// Helper function for fork PR tests
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// In real implementation, this would be in permission_checker.go
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// TODO: Refactor this into the main codebase if these tests pass
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func applyForkPRRestrictions(perms map[string]map[string]bool) map[string]map[string]bool {
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// Fork PRs get read-only access to contents and metadata, nothing else
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return map[string]map[string]bool{
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"contents": {"read": true, "write": false},
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"metadata": {"read": true, "write": false},
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"actions": {"read": false, "write": false},
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"packages": {"read": false, "write": false},
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"issues": {"read": false, "write": false},
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"pull_requests": {"read": false, "write": false},
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}
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}
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